The following testimony was presented by ISW Non-Resident Russia Fellow Nataliya Bugayova before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) on May 16, 2024.
Thank you, Chairman Wilson and honorable members of the Commission for the opportunity to contribute to this critical discussion.
The battlefield situation in Ukraine will likely worsen before it improves. Delays in Western materiel deliveries have cost Ukraine its advantage, allowing Russia to exploit vulnerabilities across the frontline. Russia aims to achieve battlefield effects before Western military assistance reaches the frontline at scale, trying to convince the United States that this aid will not make a difference, especially amid upcoming political milestones.
Ukraine can stabilize the frontline and blunt the Russian offensive as aid arrives and manpower shortages are addressed. The supplemental aid package has avoided the worst outcome, resetting possible war outcomes, which still include a Russian defeat and Ukrainian victory. This outcome depends significantly on the US learning lessons from the past two years.
Firstly, US interests in this war remain unchanged, as does the most advantageous outcome. Russia is a self-declared adversary, and the outcome of this war is central to Russia’s ability to threaten US interests. Russia’s ability to reconstitute, subjugate its neighbors, confront NATO, and cooperate militarily with partners like Iran depends on whether it keeps or loses its gains in Ukraine. Putin seeks to erase Ukraine as a state, fracture NATO, and undermine the US. A Russian victory would empower an ultra-nationalist community in Russia, leading to a potentially worse leader than Putin. Allowing Russia to prevail would result in a reconstituted Russia more determined to undermine the US, raising the risk of a Russian attack against NATO and diminishing America’s global deterrence. A premature ceasefire or insufficient aid that halts Ukraine’s advance would allow Russia to rebuild and launch new attacks, ultimately costing more lives and taxpayer dollars and risking American lives under conditions favoring Russia.
Helping Ukraine liberate its territory remains the most advantageous outcome, leading to durable peace rather than a temporary respite. This requires more capabilities and different approaches. Delays in materiel provision have cost Ukraine its advantage, and Russia has had time to adapt. Helping Ukraine restore its battlefield maneuverability is a priority, requiring more capabilities and an evolving warfighting concept. Temporary effects of air superiority can be achieved without conventional air superiority, requiring ground-based long-range strike capabilities and additional air defense capabilities at the frontlines.
Russia is not entitled to sanctuaries when it is trying to erase a nation. The West must abandon the notion that Russia can demand immunity from attacks on its rear. Existing constraints on Ukraine targeting legitimate Russian military capabilities should be removed. The West should also develop a strategy against entities like Rosatom. Shrinking Russia’s sanctuaries is key to imposing strategic dilemmas on the Kremlin.
Focusing on asymmetries rather than standard force ratios is crucial. Efforts like Ukraine’s in the Black Sea, producing outsized effects, need amplification with more resources. Surging Western capabilities by creatively allocating existing military assets and leading a global coalition to increase overall stock of capabilities is vital. Mobilizing a higher percentage of latent capacity would ensure Russia’s defeat.
Decision-making speed has been critical. Strategic clarity led to key successes, while slow decisions cost Ukraine on the battlefield. The US must proactively resource multiple Ukrainian campaigns and plan for future operations, improving knowledge sharing with Ukraine and resisting Russian influence campaigns.
The gap to help Ukraine liberate its territory is smaller than the gap Russia needs to close to achieve its objectives. The Kremlin intends to close this gap but faces limitations. Russia’s surge capacity is neither unlimited nor without constraints. Mobilizing what the Kremlin has so far is far less than what the West can mobilize on behalf of Ukraine. The notion that the war is unwinnable is a Russian information operation, which the US has the power and interest to deny.
Source: Closing the Skies, Liberating Ukraine, Helsinki Commission, May 16, 2024.