A familiar script is unfolding again, this time framed by a New York Times report that casts Tehran as newly pragmatic: Iran signals a willingness to freeze its nuclear program for the long term, provided U.S. sanctions are lifted, while drawing a bright red line around its ballistic missile arsenal. The setting matters. Talks are scheduled to open in Oman, the diplomatic waiting room where hard problems go to linger. The substance matters more. By separating the nuclear file from missiles, Tehran is not offering compromise; it is attempting to lock in the very capability that underwrites its regional coercion. In Tehran’s own telling, missiles are a vital defensive axis against Israel. In reality, they are the delivery mechanism that turns any “freeze” into a reversible pause, a switch that can be flipped the moment sanctions relief has been banked. You can almost hear the pause button click, not the off switch.
This is why negotiations with the Iranian regime, on these terms, are a waste of time unless Donald Trump intends something narrower and more performative: demonstrating to allies, skeptics, and history that every peaceful option was exhausted. Tehran’s refusal to discuss missiles is not a technical disagreement; it is the core of the problem. Missiles are the insurance policy for nuclear latency, the guarantee that enrichment caps and inspection regimes never truly constrain power. Strip away the diplomatic varnish and the offer amounts to this: remove the economic pressure while allowing the regime to keep the tool that deters consequences. That is not a deal; it is leverage transferred in one direction.
The regime’s confidence comes from precedent. Sanctions relief arrives first, compliance dribbles later, and enforcement erodes under the weight of geopolitics and fatigue. Meanwhile, centrifuges spin just slowly enough to satisfy inspectors, and missile programs advance briskly enough to remind neighbors who holds escalation dominance. Calling this a deadlock undersells it. It is a trap built from sequencing, where concessions are front-loaded and reversibility favors the party most comfortable with ambiguity. Tehran knows that Western capitals are allergic to stalemate and eager for a headline that reads like progress, even if the fine print says postponement.
If the talks proceed, they should do so without illusions. A negotiation that excludes missiles concedes the strategic high ground before the first sentence is spoken. If Washington participates anyway, it should be with eyes open and expectations minimal, using the process to document refusal, not to chase a breakthrough. That record matters. It clarifies intent. It narrows excuses. And if the moment comes when pressure must be reapplied—or increased—it anchors the argument that diplomacy was tried, thoroughly and transparently, and that the impasse was not accidental but chosen. That may be the only honest outcome left on the table.
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