



Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: Overview of U.S. Sanctions and Other Responses

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On February 24, 2022, Russia launched an undeclared war against Ukraine. The United States and countries around the world have condemned Russia's "unprecedented military aggression" as "unprovoked and unjustified." Members of legislatures, local governments, businesses, and publics in the United States and elsewhere have expressed support for Ukraine and have condemned Russia's invasion. Hundreds of U.S. and other companies have withdrawn, suspended, or curtailed operations in Russia. On March 2, 2022, the U.N. General Assembly voted 141-5 to demand Russia "immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw" from Ukraine (34 countries, including China and India, abstained).

Since December 2021, the United States and others have warned Russia's leadership that severe sanctions would follow a new attack on Ukraine, which Russia first invaded and partially occupied in 2014. The United States pledged to provide increased security assistance to Ukraine if Russia were to launch a new attack. After Russia launched its war in February 2022, the United States, the EU, and others imposed a series of increasingly severe sanctions and substantially increased military, humanitarian, and economic assistance to Ukraine. The United States alone has committed more than \$3.4 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the start of the war (see CRS In Focus IF12040, *U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine*).

Congress has provided financial support for Ukraine since the start of the war and supported sanctions and related measures against Russia. The Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division N) provides \$13.6 billion "in humanitarian, security, and economic assistance for Ukraine and neighboring countries." Congress also passed legislation prohibiting the import to the United States of Russian oil and other energy products (P.L. 117-109) and suspending normal trade relations with Russia and Belarus (P.L. 117-110). In addition, the Senate passed the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022 (S. 3522), which would expedite the leasing or lending of U.S. defense articles to Ukraine, and the House passed the Ukraine Invasion War Crimes Deterrence and Accountability Act (H.R. 7276), which would direct the President to submit a report to Congress on efforts to collect evidence related to war crimes and other atrocities (also see H.Res. 956 and S.Res. 546).

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U.S. Sanctions

U.S. sanctions and related actions since February 2022 are likely to have a greater impact on Russia than sanctions the United States has imposed previously (see CRS Report R45415, *U.S. Sanctions on Russia*). Sanctions and related actions the Biden Administration has imposed since February 21, 2022, include the following (also see CRS In Focus IF12062, *New Financial and Trade Sanctions Against Russia*).

- Full blocking sanctions (including restrictions on transactions and access to U.S.-based property or interests in property) on
 - Russian President Vladimir [Putin](#), Prime Minister Mikhail [Mishustin](#), and members of Russia’s [Security Council](#), including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov;
 - The [State Duma](#) (the lower house of Russia’s legislature) and most of its members;
 - Six of Russia’s largest [banks](#), including state-owned [Sberbank](#) (one of Russia’s top five companies) and [VTB Bank](#) and privately held [Alfa Bank](#) (with exceptions, among others, for [energy-related](#) transactions through June 24, 2022);
 - [VEB](#), a large state development bank, and the Russian Direct [Investment Fund](#), a sovereign wealth fund;
 - [Nord Stream 2 AG](#), the parent company for a natural gas pipeline project, and [Alrosa](#), the world’s largest diamond-mining company;
 - [Members](#) of Russia’s Kremlin-connected [business elite](#) (sometimes referred to as [oligarchs](#)) and family members. In coordination with partners, the U.S. government has [established](#) an interagency Task Force KleptoCapture to strengthen enforcement of sanctions and other measures [and](#) a Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Rewards Program;
 - Dozens of [defense-industrial companies](#), [disinformation operations](#), [sanctions evaders](#), and [virtual currency](#) mining companies; and
 - [Belarusian](#) individuals and entities in response to Belarus’s support for Russia’s invasion.
- [Restrictions](#) on transactions with Russia’s central bank, limiting its ability to draw on dollar-denominated foreign reserves, and transactions with Russia’s Ministry of Finance and National Wealth Fund.
- [Export controls](#) on trade with Russia and [Belarus](#), including [restrictions](#) on “sensitive U.S. technologies produced in foreign countries using U.S.-origin software, technology, or equipment” and oil and gas [extraction equipment](#).
- [Suspension](#) of normal trade relations with Russia and Belarus.
- [Ban](#) on the U.S. [import](#) of Russian crude [oil](#), petroleum products, liquefied natural gas, coal, seafood, alcoholic beverages, and nonindustrial diamonds.
- [Ban](#) on the export of U.S. luxury goods and dollar-denominated banknotes.
- [Ban](#) on new U.S. investment in Russia, including the [energy](#) sector.
- [Ban](#) on Russian aircraft entering and using U.S. airspace.
- [Ban](#) on Russian-affiliated vessels entering U.S. ports.

- **Ban** on “any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee” of transactions by foreign persons that would be prohibited to U.S. persons or in the United States.
- **Restrictions** on secondary-market transactions by U.S. financial institutions in Russian sovereign debt (previous restrictions applied to primary-market transactions).
- **Restrictions** against new equity investment and financing for companies including
 - Gazprom, a state-owned energy company and Russia’s largest firm;
 - Sovcomflot, Russia’s largest maritime and freight shipping firm; and
 - Russian Railways.
- **Visa restrictions** on 635 Russian nationals.
- **Prohibitions** on U.S. trade or investment in Russia-occupied areas of eastern Ukraine and sanctions against those operating in those areas.

International Sanctions

The **EU**, the **United Kingdom (UK)**, other non-EU countries in Europe (including Switzerland), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, among others, have imposed sanctions, export controls, or both in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Many of these sanctions are identical or similar to U.S. sanctions, although the EU has not imposed a ban on Russian oil or gas imports or full blocking sanctions on Sberbank or Alfa-Bank. The EU has **prohibited** the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and other specialized financial messaging services from serving seven other Russian financial institutions.

The **EU** and the **UK** have suspended broadcasting of Russian state-owned network RT; the EU suspended Sputnik, another state-owned network; and the UK has imposed **sanctions** on parent companies of RT and Sputnik. Two days before Russia’s attack, the German government **suspended** certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, preventing it from becoming operational.

For more, see CRS Insight IN11897, *Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: European Union Responses and Implications for U.S.-EU Relations*.

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