Saudi Arabia did not wake up one morning and suddenly decide to attack Israel in the media; the turn is the product of several very concrete calculations that all ripened at the same time, and together they explain why Riyadh flipped from quiet coordination to open hostility. The first and most immediate reason is that normalization lost its strategic value for the Saudis. For a long time, Israel was a useful bridge to Washington — a way to secure U.S. security guarantees, advanced weapons, and political backing for Mohammed bin Salman’s regional ambitions. Once that deal stalled, and once Washington proved either unwilling or unable to deliver a clear defense pact, Israel stopped being an asset and became a liability in Saudi eyes, especially in front of Arab and Muslim public opinion.
The second reason is Iran. Saudi Arabia has shifted from confrontation to risk management with Tehran, and this changes everything. Riyadh no longer wants to be seen as part of an anti-Iranian front led by Israel, particularly when it is trying to stabilize its economy, attract investment, and avoid regional escalation. Open closeness to Israel complicates that balancing act, so distancing itself publicly — even harshly — becomes a form of insurance. Attacking Israel rhetorically signals to Iran, and to the wider region, that Saudi Arabia is not lining up behind Israeli military strategy.
The third reason is internal legitimacy. Saudi leadership is deeply sensitive to domestic and pan-Arab sentiment, especially after the Gaza war reset emotions across the Arab world. Normalization with Israel became politically toxic, and the easiest way to neutralize that pressure was to flip the script: instead of defending talks with Israel, Riyadh now allows — and amplifies — media attacks against it. This restores Saudi Arabia’s credentials as a “leader of the Arab world” and protects the regime from accusations of betrayal.
The fourth reason is regional rivalry. The UAE normalized with Israel and gained enormous credit in Washington and in tech, defense, and trade circles. Saudi Arabia does not want to be seen as following Abu Dhabi’s lead. By freezing normalization and attacking Israel’s image, Riyadh reasserts that it, not the UAE, sets the political ceiling for the Arab world. This is less about Israel and more about who controls the regional narrative.
Finally, there is a tactical reason: pressure. Saudi Arabia uses hostility as leverage. By turning the media and diplomatic tone against Israel, it raises the price of any future deal. If normalization returns, it will only happen on Saudi terms — with U.S. guarantees, nuclear cooperation, and massive concessions. The anger is not emotional; it is a negotiating tactic, just conducted through megaphones instead of back channels.
Put together, Saudi Arabia’s turn against Israel is not ideological but transactional. When normalization paid, Riyadh was quiet. When it stopped paying, Riyadh turned the noise up. That’s the logic behind the shift, and that’s why the change looks sudden even though the motives are cold and calculated.
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