The war in Ukraine is often framed as Moscow’s aggression, but the evidence now shows that Beijing is deeply complicit. China’s role goes far beyond rhetoric about neutrality; it is providing know-how, hardware, logistical cover, and even clandestine sabotage capacity that directly sustains Russia’s war machine. This makes China not just a bystander, but an active perpetrator alongside Russia in Europe’s largest war since 1945.
Recent investigations reveal that Chinese drone experts have traveled to sanctioned Russian arms factories, such as IEMZ Kupol, to co-develop and test military drones used in Ukraine. These engineers were linked to Sichuan AEE Technology, and the shipments they facilitated included surveillance and attack drones with model lines like the A140 and A900. Other Chinese firms, such as Hunan Haotianyi, have been traced supplying critical components. Far from isolated cases, these collaborations are part of a wider pattern: China now provides the majority of foreign microelectronics inside Russian drones, and up to 80% of the critical electronic guts of Moscow’s UAV fleet can be sourced back to Chinese channels. Beijing’s export curbs on UAV parts have also been enforced unevenly, tightening Ukraine’s access while Russia continues to procure through front companies.
The maritime domain reveals a parallel shadow war. Chinese-operated ships have been repeatedly linked to sabotage of undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, incidents that crippled internet and energy connectivity. The Yi Peng 3 switched off its AIS transponder near the site of cut Baltic cables in late 2024, while the Newnew Polar Bear damaged a gas pipeline and telecom cables a year earlier. Analysts suggest these are not random “accidents,” but deliberate acts of hybrid warfare where Chinese merchant vessels are weaponized in coordination with Russia to test and fracture Europe’s critical infrastructure.
At the same time, cyberspace has become a joint battlefield. Ukraine has accused Moscow of using Chinese spyware, software, and technical expertise in cyberattacks on its institutions. Western threat monitors have observed Chinese malware and intrusion tools being repurposed by Russian operators. Beijing’s hackers have also probed Ukraine directly, sometimes even turning their skills on Russia itself to steal military secrets, underscoring a complex mix of cooperation and competition. Yet the bottom line remains: Russia’s cyber arsenal benefits from Chinese contributions.
Put together, these threads form a sobering picture. China supplies the parts, the engineers, the smuggling corridors, the ships, and the software that make Russia’s war sustainable. Its fingerprints appear on the drones striking Ukrainian cities, on the anchors dragging across Baltic seabeds, and in the malicious code breaching Ukrainian servers. Every channel—industrial, maritime, digital—reveals a state that is not neutral but enabling.
To call Beijing a co-perpetrator in the war on Ukraine is not exaggeration but recognition of fact. Russia’s aggression is amplified and hardened by Chinese technology, logistics, and deniable sabotage. The war is no longer only Russia’s—it is a joint project of authoritarian powers testing the resilience of Europe and the West. And until strategy shifts to recognize and confront China’s role head-on, Ukraine will continue fighting not just one adversary, but two.
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